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This paper studies the level of banking competition in two European countries, Germany and 
Portugal, for the period from 2006 to 2015 in order to draw indications on its impact on 
economic and financial stability. Banking competition is measured using the Panzar-Rosse test 
and the Lerner Index, two statistical tests developed for this matter. The results of the tests 
illustrate a consistently higher level of competition in the German banking sector than in the 
Portuguese around the financial crisis. Following from this, this paper supports the assumption 
that higher bank competition might be seen as an indicator for increasing financial stability. 





The development of competition and concentration in the banking industry and its impact on 
financial stability has been a topic of discussion for decades. It has particularly been questioned 
how far different states of competition in banking markets foster or alleviate financial fragility 
and economic stability. Whereas positive effects of competition like increased levels of 
innovation and efficiency within financial products are widely accepted, academic literature 
has not yet reached an agreement upon adverse impacts on stability. As the most recent financial 
crisis of 2008 has once more reinforced the relevance of the topic, this paper aims to contribute 
to the empirical literature by regarding the relationship between competition in banking and 
financial instability. Therefore, a cross-country comparison between Germany and Portugal has 
been conducted on the competitive behaviour of the two banking markets in order to take 
indications on the hypothesis that different levels of competition influenced the impact of the 




stability of banking markets, it is necessary to measure competition in an adequate manner, 
which is the objective of this paper. For future research it is necessary to establish an empirical 
connection between levels of competition and financial stability. 
 The reason to investigate this research question for the stated countries is twofold. 
Foremost, the existing empirical literature on the topic reveals a gap with regards to studies 
analysing banking competition in Europe after the financial crisis. Although some studies have 
assessed this issue also after the crisis, they have focussed either on a single country or have 
analysed data on an aggregate EU level without distinguishing between competition in different 
EU countries. However, due to the substantially different impact the financial crisis had on EU 
countries, a direct comparison between two countries can reveal relevant information on the 
effect of banking competition on financial stability. Hence, this paper can contribute to fill this 
gap, as, to the best knowledge of the author, no study comparing two countries has been 
performed for the mentioned period. Secondly, the cause for observing data from Germany and 
Portugal lies in the specific characteristics and differences between the countries. First of all, 
while Germany is the EU’s largest net creditor country (i.e. a country, that holds more financial 
assets abroad than liabilities), Portugal is one of the largest net debtors in the EU1 (Obrzut, 
2016). Moreover, Portugal has been one of the countries most affected by the recent financial 
crisis and has consequently received support in a joint rescue operation by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the so-called 
Troika (European Commission, 2011). In addition to this, a major geographical and size 
difference separates both countries’ economies, as Germany is the largest European economy 
and accounts for over 20% of the GDP of the EU, whereas the significantly smaller Portuguese 
economy amounts to only 1.2% of the EU’s GDP (Eurostat, 2017). Considering these factors 
could lead to empirical results potentially providing noteworthy indications for other EU 
                                                                                                              
1 In 2015 Germany registered a net international investment position (IIP) within the EU of 1,482 billion Euro (49% of the country’s GDP), while Portugal’s net 




countries, such as general competition disparities between economies of different size or 
economies in different creditor-debtor positions.  
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II a short overview will 
be given on the state of empirical literature on the relationship between banking competition 
and financial stability. Moreover, different methodologies for measuring competition will be 
introduced and briefly discussed, before the respective methodology and data selection 
underlying this paper will be explained in more detail in the Section III. Section IV contains the 
empirical results and analysis of the study in context of the research question and Section V 
will conclude this paper by highlighting the main findings and implications for the topic. 
II. Literature review and empirical evidence 
The extensive literature on the interdependence between banking competition and systemic 
financial stability can historically be classified into two opposing groups, namely the 
“competition-fragility” and the “competition-stability” theories (Berger et al., 2009). The 
former is based on the traditional idea of the “charter value hypothesis” as introduced by several 
authors (Keeley, 1990; Saunders & Wilson, 2001), which states that competition decreases 
banks’ market power and hence leads to shrinking profit margins. Hellmann et al. (2000) note 
that the following erosion of the banks’ franchise value2 leads to decreasing opportunity costs 
of bankruptcy, which potentially incentivises excessive risk-taking behaviour and jeopardises 
individual bank’s and systemic stability. For this reason, proponents of the theory contend that 
competition in the banking segment is leading to increased financial instability (Allen & Gale, 
2000; Keeley, 1990). An additional argument is that banks operating in less competitive 
markets and thus earning higher profits from interests, are more willing to monitor their 
respective borrowers, while a smaller number of banks enables better monitoring by regulators 
as well, which would have a risk decreasing effect (Allen & Gale, 2000). Furthermore, it is 
                                                                                                              




argued that large sized banks can diversify their business risk more effectively, implying that it 
is favourable to establish a system featuring a small number of large banks in order to prevent 
fragility (Allen & Gale, 2004; Beck, 2008). Finally, this idea of competition being detrimental 
for stability in the banking industry is supported by the evidence found in several empirical 
studies (Berger et al., 2009; Jiménez et al., 2013; Repullo, 2004). 
In contrast to that, proponents of the “competition-stability” theory counter that 
increasing banking market competition decreases both the risk of individual banks’ failure as 
well as the systemic risk for several reasons. First, it is argued that in a system dominated by a 
few banks, the existing market power enables these banks to charge higher interest rates to firms 
and other clients. Consequently, these clients are incentivised to take on greater risk to 
compensate for the increased costs, leading to a more fragile financial system due to the 
borrowers’ behaviour (Boyd & De Nicoló, 2003; Boyd et al., 2010). In addition, large banks 
are often seen as being system-relevant and have profited from government bailout subsidies 
following their own distorted risk-taking behaviour in the past. The underlying “Too Big to 
Fail” assumption in correlation with the increasing complexity of large banking organisations 
can be seen as another reason to support the stability promoting impact of banking competition 
(Acharya et al., 2011; Restoy, 2017). Moreover, a more competitive banking system is less 
fragile to shocks, due to the fact that banks operating in this system are forced to diversify their 
risk exposure (Anginer et al., 2014). These ideas have been complemented by numerous 
empirical studies, which support the hypothesis of bank competition being conducive to 
stability in financial systems (Akins et al. 2016; Fernández et al., 2016; Leroy & Lucotte, 2017; 
Schaeck et al., 2006). 
Proponents of these theoretical streams have tried to assess the degree of competition in 
the banking industry using different methodologies, which can be divided into the two major 




concentration measures describing the structure of a market as an indication for market power 
and competition. Several empirical studies are based on structural approaches with general 
concentration ratios (Akins et al., 2016; Casu & Girardone, 2009; Koetter, 2013) and the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (Berger et al., 2009; Carbó et al., 2009; Jiménez et al., 2013; 
Koetter, 2013) being the most widely used techniques. However, these structural indicators 
have delivered ambiguous results in the past and are seen as a weak measure for banking 
competitiveness (Berger et al., 2004). For example, several studies have illustrated situations 
in which concentrated banking markets were found to display highly competitive behaviour, 
while certain unconcentrated markets have shown signs of considerable market power of single 
banking organisations. The implied assumption that concentrated markets are not competitive 
is therefore at least questionable and raises legitimate doubts about the validity of structural 
metrics to measure banking competition (Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Shaffer, 2004). 
Following from that, the majority of recent empirical literature is based on non-
structural competition measures such as the Lerner Index (Anginer et al., 2014; Berger et al., 
2009; Cruz-García et al., 2017; Leroy & Lucotte, 2017; Spierdijk & Zaouras, 2017) or the 
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (Amaral, 2015; Amaral & Machado, 2017; Apergis et al., 2016; 
Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Koetter, 2013; Schaeck et al., 2006; Weill, 
2013). These approaches assess banking competition by directly analysing banks’ behaviour 
and their consequential market power in relation to other market participants’ behaviour. By 
doing so, these measures take into consideration that factors such as the general contestability 
of a market, entry and exit barriers or potential outside competition might not be reflected in 
the market structure and concentration (Casu & Girardone, 2009; Panzar & Rosse, 1987). 
Hence, non-structural techniques have the advantage of eliminating the beforementioned source 
of error arising from the assumption that the degree of competition can directly be derived from 




be assessed using both the non-structural Panzar-Rosse statistic and the Lerner Index. The 
combination of these two tests is anticipated to enhance the validity of the results compared to 
using only one test. 
 The existing empirical analyses based on non-structural competition measures are 
diverse with regards to their regional focus and the observed time periods. Whereas most of the 
studies consider data from years up to the financial crisis, only a few like Barbosa et al. (2015), 
Koetter (2013) or Weill (2013) have extended their sample to the period after the financial 
crisis, while utilising the Panzar-Rosse methodology. However, in terms of geographical focus, 
these studies have only measured competition in single countries. Combining the attributes of 
regional focus and considered time frame, to the best of the author’s knowledge no existing 
empirical study using the Panzar-Rosse approach is incorporating a cross-country comparison 
of banking competition in the EU after the financial crisis. Thus, this paper can make a 
contribution to the existing literature by comparing and analysing the competitive structure in 
two EU member countries, Germany and Portugal, in the period between 2006 and 2015.  
III.  Data and methodology 
The first test used in this paper to assess the level of banking competition is the Panzar-Rosse 
model as adopted by Amaral (2015) and Amaral & Machado (2017) based on the propositions 
of Panzar and Rosse (1987), Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Bikker et al. (2007). The approach 
defines three models of oligopolistic, competitive and monopolistic markets and distinguishes 
between these using the test statistic H. This test statistic is defined to be a measure of banks’ 
competitiveness in a certain market and is retrieved using a reduced-form revenue equation on 
the basis of two assumptions. First, it is assumed that a bank’s operations can, similar to other 
firms, be expressed by a production function 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖, … 𝑥𝑛), where 𝑦𝑖 are outputs and 𝑥𝑖 
denotes all inputs, while operating in a long-term equilibrium. In relation to that, the bank’s 




to the revenue function, which is affected by various exogenous variables 𝑧𝑖. Similarly, the cost 
function 𝐶(𝑦𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖, 𝑡𝑖) contains several input prices (𝑤𝑖) and exogenous variables (𝑡𝑖) 
influencing the bank’s costs. Following from that, the second assumption implies that a bank 
maximizes its profit when marginal revenue equals marginal cost (asterisk refers to marginal 
values) in a perfectly competitive market with free entry and exit:  
𝑅∗(𝑦𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) − 𝐶
∗(𝑦𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖, 𝑡𝑖) = 0    (1) 
The model measures the market power of a bank by verifying the extent to which a change in 
input prices 𝜕𝑤𝑖 affects equilibrium revenue 𝜕𝑅𝑒. More specifically, the alteration rate of 




𝑖=1  . Based on this, Panzar 
and Rosse define the test statistic H as a competition measure, which equals the elasticity of 







𝑖=1                 (2) 
They proved that in existence of a monopoly H will be zero or negative because increasing 
input prices will increase marginal cost and consequently reduce both equilibrium output and 
revenues. The same applies for a perfectly colluding oligopoly. In contrast, a perfectly 
competitive market implies that input price increases do not negatively influence revenue and 
output, hence H is larger or equal to 1 in this case. This assumes that in perfect competition the 
least efficient firms will exit the market as a result of rising input prices, which increases outputs 
and revenues of all other firms. A situation featuring an H in between of these limits illustrates 
a form of oligopoly, which only in the long run displays certain features similar to perfectly 
competitive markets. This state is referred to as monopolistic competition and it implies an 




Following this framework, Amaral (2015) and Amaral & Machado (2017) established 
an empirical panel data test, which is used in this paper. The baseline specifications of this 
regression model are: 
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
                    𝛾3𝑙𝑛𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑙𝑛𝐾𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡    (3) 
 
While the dependent variable in (3) is the natural logarithm of interest revenue divided by total 
assets (IRA), the test has also been conducted using the natural logarithm of interest revenue 
without dividing it by total assets (IR). The independent variables can be divided into input 
prices and various exogenous variables, which are included to capture the differing costs, risks 
and structural components of all banks. With regards to input prices it was necessary to use 
proxies due to data constraints. The variable for labour costs (WL) would have been described 
best using the ratio of total wage expenditures to the total workforce. However, as information 
on personnel could not consistently be extracted especially in the case of smaller banks, the 
ratio of total wage expenditures to total assets was used as a proxy. Similarly, the price of 
physical capital (WK), which is defined as the capital expenditures of a bank related to the assets 
used for production, needed to be proxied as well. Due to missing immediate figures for these 
expenditures on physical capital, the variable was estimated by a residue between total costs 
excluding interest and wage expenses, which was divided by fixed assets. The last variable for 
input prices is the average funding cost (WF). As it is derived from the ratio of interest paid to 
interest bearing debt, it is a comparably better estimate for the true variable. Based on this, the 
H-statistic corresponds to the sum of coefficients of all three input price variables so that: 𝐻 =
(𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3).  
The first exogenous variable is related to the funding mix and is indicated as the ratio of 
a bank’s demand deposits to total debt (DTD). In addition to that, two variables are introduced 




by total assets (LA), the credit mix variable is retrieved when dividing interbank deposits by 
loans (IBL). An additional variable is implemented to account for the banks’ activities 
transcending mere financial intermediation and is measured as the ratio of off-balance sheet 
activities to total assets (OBSA). Furthermore, branching is quantified as total assets divided by 
total branches (AB), whereas the banks’ assumed risk is measured by the capital-assets ratio 
(KA). Finally, the ratio of other revenue to interest revenue (OIR) is introduced, in which other 
revenue includes all reported income items next to interest revenue such as return on foreign 
exchange operations or commissions revenue. The model is complemented by an error term . 
The test was moreover conducted using dependent variables described by both total revenue 
(TR) and total revenue divided by total assets (TRA), while maintaining all other specifications.  
Although the Panzar-Rosse model has been widely applied in empirical literature, some 
of its specifications and interpretations have been a topic for discussion. First of all, the above-
mentioned use of total assets in the dependent variable has been opposed by certain authors. 
While the introduction of total assets was meant to be a practical solution to scale the dependent 
variable in order to consider a bank’s size, the suitability of this specification has been 
questioned. The reason for this is that a scaled dependent variable must be interpreted as the 
bank’s lending rate, which subsequently “transforms the revenue equation into a price equation” 
(Bikker et al., 2007). Following from this, the model only measures price competition without 
regarding other forms of competition, which leads to a serious misspecification (Bikker et al., 
2007; Goddard & Wilson, 2009). Many recent studies have adopted this interpretation (Bikker 
et al., 2012) and this paper similarly responds to the criticism by using both scaled and unscaled 
dependent variables. Another criticism of the model is related to the interpretation of its test 
statistic H. As described before perfect competition in a long-term equilibrium would present 
𝐻 = 1, whereas a situation of monopoly would equal a test statistic of 𝐻 ≤ 0. However, Bikker 




situation of highly competitive conduct in the short run, whereas the actual interpretation of the 
result would be to assume a monopoly or perfectly colluding oligopoly. At the same time, 
Shaffer & Spierdijk (2013 and 2015) introduced several theoretical scenarios based on a 
situation of monopoly or colluding oligopoly, which exhibit positive values for the H-statistic 
and therefore contradict the original interpretation.  
Due to these potential limitations of the Panzar-Rosse approach, other models have been 
used to test for the degree of bank competition by the beforementioned authors. However, these 
other measures such as the Lerner Index or the Boone indicator entail validity compromising 
problems as well. For example, the Lerner Index only incorporates price related competition 
without acknowledging other possible competition factors like product and service variation or 
accessibility (Léon, 2014). In addition, the Lerner Index uses marginal costs as a variable. Since 
these costs are not directly observable from bank accounting data but are retrieved using varying 
econometric calculations, the resulting statistics are heavily depending on the underlying 
techniques and assumptions (Amaral & Machado, 2017). Similarly, the more recent Boone 
indicator implies certain problems such as an ambiguity within the interpretation of its results 
much like in the case of Panzar-Rosse tests (Léon, 2014). Therefore, none of the proposed 
measures can produce absolutely sound results and be seen as preferable to other methods. 
Instead, each test needs to be used and interpreted against the background of its flaws. Thus, 
this paper uses the Panzar-Rosse approach in the full knowledge of its potential problems, while 
also conducting the Lerner Index in order to compare the outcomes and hence address any 
potential limitations of both tests.  
The Lerner Index is calculated on individual bank level and is defined as “the difference 
between price and marginal cost as a percentage of price” (Leroy & Lucotte, 2017). When 
comparing these figures, Lerner (1934) assumes that a situation of “social optimum […] is 




equal. Therefore, a high index figure corresponds to a state of low competition and vice versa. 
More precisely, the index ranges between zero and one, and while an index value of zero 
indicates perfect competition, a monopoly is assumed when the index is equal to one. As stated 
by Leroy and Lucotte (2017), the Lerner index has one substantial advantage over other 
measures, which is the ability to assess the development of competition over time at the 
individual bank level. Hence, the use of this test index cannot only enhance the findings of this 
paper by reassessing the results of the main Panzar-Rosse test but moreover by adding 
information on the progression of banking competition in both countries. 
 In this paper the author follows the methodological approach proposed by Anginer et 
al. (2014), estimating the following log cost function with price of funds (WF), price of labour 
(WL) and price of physical capital (WK) as input prices: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2(𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡)
2 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐾𝑖𝑡 +
                            𝛿6(𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 × 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐹𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿7(𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 × 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐿𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿8(𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 × 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐾𝑖𝑡) +






+ 𝛿12(𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐹𝑖𝑡 ×  𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐿𝑖𝑡) +
                            𝛿13(𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐹𝑖𝑡 ×  𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿14(𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐿𝑖𝑡 ×  𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝑖𝑡        (4) 
 
While WF and WL are the same ratios as for the Panzar-Rosse test, WK in this test is calculated 
using total assets instead of fixed assets. Furthermore, Cit represents the banks’ total costs and 
Qit is expressed by total assets as a measure for the output quantity of each bank. Several of the 
resulting coefficient estimates from the regression in (4) are then used to compute the banks’ 




× (𝛿1 + 2 × 𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐾𝑖𝑡)      (5) 
 




                                                                                                    (6) 




 The dataset for both countries consists of commercial banks operating at a nation-wide 
level, which include typical retail banking features such as demand or savings deposits. While 
this includes subsidiaries of foreign banks, locally restricted banks are not considered. In the 
case of Germany, these restricted banks include publicly owned savings banks as well as 
cooperative banks, as they possess certain privileges such as the right to consider loans to other 
public savings banks or cooperative banks as risk-free, effectively leading to underestimated 
capital requirements compared to other banks (International Monetary Fund, 2011; Wilson et 
al., 2012). In addition to that, all member banks of the “Savings Banks Finance Group” are 
secured under the Institutional Protection Scheme, which means that in case a public savings 
bank is under financial distress, all other savings banks are obliged to provide financial support 
(Savings Banks Finance Group, n.d.). Hence, these local savings and cooperative banks are not 
considered due to their significantly different risk exposure and strategic objective compared to 
other banks, while publicly owned state banks are included if they operate country-wide similar 
to other retail banks. The datasets for both countries lack data for several banks for which the 
relevant reports could not be retrieved. However, as most of these banks are foreign subsidiaries 
and of small importance due to their size, their absence in the sample does not have a crucial 
impact on the test results. 
The data for Portuguese banks was extracted directly from the bank’s financial 
statements as presented in the respective annual reports, while data for German banks has been 
retrieved from the Bundesanzeiger, an official publication by the German department of Justice. 
Hence, it was possible to derive an unbalanced panel of annual data with 173 observations for 
Portugal and 575 observations for Germany. A bank fixed effects OLS regression was used to 
estimate both models and the resulting descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 3 and 4 for 




IV. Test results & implications 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Panzar-Rosse model it is necessary to test if the 
respective market is in long-run equilibrium, as pointed out by Panzar and Rosse (1987). 
Following the proposals of Shaffer (1982) and Molyneux et al. (1994) this requirement is 
assessed by conducting the beforementioned Panzar-Rosse test with the banks’ return on assets 
(ROA) constituting the dependent variable. Using the assumption that rates of return should not 
show a correlation to input prices in a situation of long-run equilibrium, it was tested whether 
the respective H-statistic is significantly different from zero or not. Hence, in the latter case the 
existence of a long-run equilibrium can be assumed. The results displayed in the first two rows 
of Tables 3 and 4 respectively highlight that the H-statistic for Germany and Portugal does not 
significantly differ from zero, so that a long-term equilibrium can be assumed for both 
countries’ bank markets. 
Therefore, it is possible to assess the level of competition for Germany and Portugal 
using the Panzar-Rosse approach. The overall period was divided into the two sub-periods, 
2006-2008 and 2009-2015, to draw possible conclusions on the state of competition before and 
after the financial crisis. For both periods it was tested for monopoly or a perfectly colluding 
oligopoly as well as for perfect competition. The test for a monopoly featured a one-sided test 
based on the null hypothesis that 𝐻 ≤ 0 with the alternative hypothesis being 𝐻 > 0. Similarly, 
perfect competition was tested for using a two-sided test in which 𝐻 = 1 was the null 
hypothesis and 𝐻 ≠ 1 described the alternative hypothesis. All test results are shown in Tables 
3 and 4 as well. 
The results for Germany are ambiguous and dependent on the specifications underlying 
the test. When the test is conducted using one of the scaled dependent variables IRA or TRA, 
both null hypotheses can be rejected for the sub-periods (see rows 5-6 and 9-10 of Table 3). 




monopolistic competition between 2006 and 2015. However, considering the nowadays 
generally accepted interpretation of Bikker et al. (2007) that a dependent variable scaled using 
total assets coincides with a price equation, these results only describe the level of competition 
with regards to pricing. Hence, using these specifications it becomes apparent that price 
competition between German banks was on a moderate level in the period.  
In order to draw conclusions on the overall level of competition, one needs to consider 
the test results with a non-scaled variable. As shown in rows 3-4 and 7-8, the null hypotheses 
for a perfectly colluding oligopoly are rejected for all sub-periods, regardless if tested for total 
returns or interest returns. This highlights that the German banking sector did not feature a 
perfectly colluding oligopoly at any point during this time. On the other hand, the test results 
reveal that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of 𝐻 = 1 for both dependent variables, thus 
the existence of perfect competition cannot be rejected. These results are partly differing from 
existing works in the current literature, which have assessed banking competition in Germany 
for earlier periods (Casu & Girardone, 2009; Claessens & Laeven, 2004; De Bandt & Davis, 
2000; Weill, 2013). While these studies also rule out a situation of monopoly, they 
simultaneously reject the existence of perfect competition with the prevailing results suggesting 
that banks in Germany face monopolistic competition. However, it needs to be considered that 
the bank samples for these studies are different from the sample used in this test. Whereas 
publicly owned savings banks and cooperative banks have not been considered in this paper, 
the other works included those banks. As these banks focus on very restricted local markets 
they often operate in rather uncompetitive surroundings exhibiting features of monopolies or 
perfectly colluding oligopolies, which could explain why the results of this study indicate higher 
competition. Moch (2013) supports this explanation by illustrating that competition for large 




results of his study revealed that it was not possible to reject the hypothesis of perfect 
competition for a sub-sample of only larger banks, which is line with the results of this work. 
Analysing the test results for the Portuguese dataset, it becomes apparent that the 
outcomes are similar to the beforementioned results for Germany when a scaled dependent 
variable is used for the test. As can be seen in rows 5-6 and 9-10 in Table 4, the hypothesis for 
a perfectly colluding oligopoly and the hypothesis for perfect competition are rejected for most 
tests using IRA and TRA as dependent variables. Only the test using IRA for the period before 
the crisis shows a moderate significance for a state of perfectly colluding oligopoly. As a result, 
the Portuguese banking sector probably also featured a state of monopolistic price competition 
with a potential tendency towards a perfectly colluding oligopoly.  
However, the outcomes for the H-statistic in the Portuguese banking industry strongly 
differ from the German results when the non-scaled variables TR and IR are used. The test 
statistic is distinctly smaller than zero in both periods irrespective of the variable, which leads 
to rejection of the null hypothesis for perfect competition (see rows 3-4 and 7-8). In contrast to 
that, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis for perfectly colluding oligopoly in the Portuguese 
banking market for the two periods between 2006 and 2015. This outcome is different from the 
results of other studies such as the ones from Claessens & Laeven (2004) or Carbó et al. (2009), 
who find the bank market in Portugal to be of monopolistic competition. However, these studies 
observe different time periods and bank samples, wherefore the results cannot be directly 
compared to the outcomes of this study. On the other hand Amaral & Machado (2017) likewise 
find that a perfectly colluding oligopoly cannot be rejected for the Portuguese banking market 
and findings from Schoenmaker (2011) also reveal a negative H statistic for Portugal before 




In order to address possible deficiencies of the Panzar-Rosse statistic, the Lerner Index 
was computed for both countries as a comparable test statistic. Table 5 shows the average yearly 
Lerner Index for German and Portuguese banks between 2006 and 2015. As can be retrieved, 
these results support the outcomes for the Panzar-Rosse test to a certain extent. First, it needs 
to be said that the Lerner Index measures competition only at the price level, which is similar 
to the Panzar-Rosse test when using scaled-dependent variables. Hence, the Lerner Index 
supports the existence of monopolistic competition in Germany and Portugal as it is between 
zero and one and therefore conforms with the Panzar-Rosse test in this regard. Moreover, in 
conjunction with the outcomes of other studies it becomes apparent that bank market power in 
the Portuguese banking sector has mostly been above the European average in the past as well 
as in the observed period (Coccorese, 2014; Fernández et al., 2016)3. Hence, although these 
results do reveal a situation of monopolistic competition, they indicate a comparatively low 
bank competition in Portugal, which is nonetheless partly supportive to the findings of the 
Panzar-Rosse test in this paper. Furthermore, the results indicate that the level of average bank 
market power was consistently and significantly lower in Germany than in Portugal over the 
whole period, which also indicates distinctly higher banking competition in Germany. These 
results are in accordance with findings of other studies using the Lerner index, which observe 
levels of bank market power for the two countries similar to the ones found in this study (Cruz-
García et al., 2017; Weill, 2013).  
Regarding the development of competition, it can be stated that bank market power 
decreased in both countries from 2006 to 2011 before increasing back to near pre-crisis levels 
until 2015. These findings contradict the H-statistic results to a certain extent, which revealed 
a constant situation of perfect competition in Germany and perfectly colluding oligopoly in 
Portugal. This might be due to the fact that the year on year differences as shown by the Lerner 
                                                                                                              
3 Coccorese (2014) states that the average LI for Portugal is 0.16 as compared to a LI of 0.09 for Southern Europe and 0.08 for Western Europe for the period 




index are not substantial enough to have a major influence on the average state of competition 
in the sub-periods. For instance, the results illustrate two significant drops in bank market power 
for Portuguese banks in 2008 and 2011. However, as the Panzar-Rosse test was conducted for 
the average competition over the periods from 2006 to 2008 and 2009 to 2015, these decreases 
are possibly offset by the considerably higher market power indicators for the other years in the 
period. While it could still be interesting to analyse the causes for certain changes in the 
development of the Lerner index, these irregularities hence do not compromise the significance 
of the results for the H-statistics. In general, it can therefore be stated that both the Panzar-
Rosse test as well as the Lerner index deliver congruent results. However, as the Lerner Index 
only measures price competition, the additional results of the Panzar-Rosse test indicating a 
perfectly colluding oligopoly in Portugal and perfect competition in Germany would need to be 
validated with another form of test in the future. Nevertheless, the observation of both tests’ 
findings illustrates a significant difference in the level of banking competition in Germany and 
Portugal.  
In order to draw conclusions on these results it seems vital to answer two main questions. 
First, it is of particular interest to identify the drivers of the different states of competition in 
both countries. Secondly, it needs to be assessed how and to what extent the competition level 
has influenced financial stability and the process of recovery from the financial crisis. The first 
question seems to be answered in large part by the significantly different levels of concentration 
in the countries. Although concentration cannot always be seen as a good proxy for competition, 
it can still often be a pivotal explanation for the difference in banking competition, which also 
seems to be true when comparing these two countries. The German market is highly overbanked 
not only compared to Portugal but also in a Europe-wide consideration (Cermak, 2017), which 
subsequently leads to low concentration and distinct competitive pressure. The Portuguese 




increasing throughout the course of the financial crisis (European Central Bank, 2017)4. Due to 
this major difference in concentration between the countries, it seems adequate to assume this 
to be one of the drivers of the varying levels of competition between Germany and Portugal. 
Regarding the second issue the answer does not appear to be as evident. First of all, it 
needs to be considered that both countries have faced significant turmoil in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. Germany was one of the first countries to be affected by the outburst of the 
American subprime crisis leading to a major bailout programme for the financial sector as well 
as a general economic downturn (Reiermann & Reuter, 2009; Bloomberg, 2008). On the other 
hand, Portugal incurred a situation of financial instability at the start of the European sovereign 
debt crisis a couple of years later, following from which the country applied for support from 
the Troika and several banks needed to be bailed out as well (Almeida, 2017; Reuters, 2011). 
However, the implications of these crises on the respective banking sector and overall economy 
have been vastly different. While German banks experienced a major drop in returns after 2008, 
the average return on equity remained positive throughout the crisis years (Morsink & Pradhan, 
2016). Similarly, the country’s economy quickly recovered from the major setback in 2009 and 
economic output exceeded pre-crisis levels as early as 2011 (Spiegel, 2011). Contrary to that, 
the Portuguese banking sector recorded almost constantly negative returns until 2016 and the 
overall number of employees in the industry decreased by as much as 20% as compared to 8% 
in Germany (Associacào Portuguesa de Bancos, 2017; Oliver Wyman, 2017). Moreover, the 
Portuguese economy yielded negative growth rates until 2014 and has only left the Euro area’s 
“excessive deficit procedure” in 2017 (Brunsden et al., 2017). Combining these factors with the 
beforementioned results on the nature of competition, it might be reasonable to state that a 
                                                                                                              
4 The European Central Bank report (2017) on financial integration highlights that the share of the five largest banks’ total assets on the overall banking sector 




higher level of competition in banking as observed in Germany can be assumed to be an 
indication for superior financial stability and economic recovery.  
However, in order to make a definite statement on this relationship one would need to 
introduce a test, which clearly defines the state of financial instability and directly measures the 
influence of competition on this financial instability. Moreover, it is necessary to pay attention 
to factors outside of competition that might also have influenced the different consequences of 
the financial crisis in both countries. As an example, the loan quality of German banks is better 
not only compared to Portugal but to most other EU countries as well, wherefore German banks 
did not suffer as much from non-performing loans in the course of the crisis (Kiene & Hessmert, 
2016). Similarly, German banks traditionally hold more long-maturity assets with interest rates 
being fixed for a longer time, which has helped to withstand the last years of historically low 
interest rates (Koch et al., 2016). At the same time, these low interest rates and the weak Euro 
have paved the way for the success of German companies’ exports, which was the main driver 
for the country’s economic recovery. The banking sector also benefitted heavily from this 
development as lending to both enterprises as well as households increased due to the positive 
economic outlook (Koch et al., 2016).  
V.  Conclusion 
This paper aimed to find the best way to measure competition having in mind the relationship 
between banking competition and financial stability on the example of the financial crisis in 
2008. In order to investigate the research hypothesis that competition in banking influenced a 
country’s financial stability during this time as well as its economic recovery, a cross-country 
comparison between Germany and Portugal has been executed measuring the respective levels 
of competition in banking markets. The level of bank competition in both countries has been 
measured and classified using two different statistical models, namely the Panzar-Rosse test 




banking market has been in a situation of almost perfect competition, the results for Portugal 
diverged to a certain extent. The Panzar-Rosse test delivered results showing a situation where 
a perfectly colluding oligopoly could not be rejected for the Portuguese bank market, whereas 
the Lerner Index also highlighted an above average competition level but revealed more 
moderate results. Nevertheless, both tests combined highlighted a significantly higher level of 
competition in the German banking sector between 2006 and 2015 as compared to Portugal.  
Hence, it seems to be reasonable to propose that the level of competition is a potential 
indicator for the ability of a country’s banking sector and overall economy to absorb and 
overcome a situation of financial instability as a hypothesis to be further tested in the future. As 
illustrated by its results, this paper is consonant with the “competition-stability” view, whose 
proponents support that competition in banking fosters financial stability. However, since the 
relationship was not empirically tested in this paper all results must be seen as indications. 
Moreover, other specific factors influence the financial resilience of a country, which thus also 
need to be considered when assessing in how far the relation between banking competition and 
financial stability is described by a causality as opposed to mere correlation. Hence, in future 
research on the topic it would be beneficial to introduce a test measuring the direct relationship 
between banking competition and financial stability. Furthermore, increasing the number of 
observed countries as well conducting a larger variety of empirical tests in future research 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Summary statistics - Germany 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics - Portugal 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
ROA 173 0.004 0.016 -0.062 0.061 
TR 173 1,415.833 2,109.201 5.000 10,486.000 
IR 173 1,024.355 1,476.053 0.800 7,326.000 
TRA 173 0.064 0.027 0.017 0.230 
IRA 173 0.041 0.016 0.007 0.093 
WL 173 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.043 
WK 173 3.782 2.754 0.578 17.889 
WF 173 0.046 0.326 0.002 0.180 
DTD 173 0.192 0.151 0.007 0.945 
LA 173 0.595 0.230 0.024 0.970 
IBL 173 0.276 1.182 0.002 13.850 
OBSA 173 0.433 0.609 0.004 3.713 
AB 173 171.983 373.805 15.934 2,761.057 
KA 173 0.078 0.082 0.019 0.515 
OIR 173 0.779 1.493 0.069 11.692 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
ROA 575 0.005 0.013 -0.160 0.094 
TR 575 5,554.607 16,434.010 0.700 85,278.000 
IR 575 4,401.450 14,194.790 0.031 64,675.000 
TRA 575 0.059 0.046 0.013 0.369 
IRA 575 0.040 0.020 0.001 0.123 
WL 575 0.008 0.008 0.0003 0.079 
WK 575 59.286 191.354 0.261 2,230.556 
WF 575 0.036 0.043 0.002 0.280 
DTD 575 0.317 0.237 0.001 0.946 
LA 575 0.560 0.236 0.012 0.985 
IBL 575 0.231 0.686 0.001 8.693 
OBSA 575 0.283 0.286 0.000 0.516 
AB 575 5,135.235 16,019.840 12.938 147,788.000 
KA 575 0.061 0.043 0.007 0.654 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Average Lerner Indices for the German and Portuguese banking sector 
 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Ø 
Germany 0,101 0,072 0,017 0,020 0,076 0,042 0,084 0,099 0,108 0,113 0,073 
Portugal 0,278 0,219 0,128 0,190 0,154 0,084 0,163 0,178 0,193 0,209 0,180 
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